“before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody”
(Aristoteles, Rhetorik, Buch I, Kapitel 1 (Alternativlink), in der Übersetzung von W. Rhys Roberts)
“we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him.”
(Aristoteles, ebd., m. Hvh.)
"before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody"
(Aristoteles, Rhetorik, Buch I, Kapitel 1 (Alternativlink), in der Übersetzung von W. Rhys Roberts)
"we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him."
(Aristoteles, ebd., m. Hvh.) Johannes Koelman hat einen einführenden Artikel zu Gier und spieltheoretischen Strategien gepostet [via Boing Boing], der sehr gut das Nash-Equilibrium veranschaulicht:
“You are in a game show with nineteen other players. You don’t know the other players, you can’t see them, and you can’t communicate with them. The game you are in is called ‘Greed!’, and is straightforward to explain. You are asked to write down a whole dollar amount in the range $1 – $1,000,000 on a piece of paper. You will be paid the amount you asked for if it is deemed to be ‘non-greedy’. Whether your request is indeed ‘non-greedy’ will be decided once all twenty request have been received by the host of the show. Your requested amount will be labeled ‘non-greedy’ if no other player has asked for less, and at least one player has asked for more.
How do you play?” [Weiter]
Johannes Koelman hat einen einführenden Artikel zu Gier und spieltheoretischen Strategien gepostet [via Boing Boing], der sehr gut das Nash-Equilibrium veranschaulicht:
"You are in a game show with nineteen other players. You don't know the other players, you can't see them, and you can't communicate with them. The game you are in is called 'Greed!', and is straightforward to explain. You are asked to write down a whole dollar amount in the range $1 - $1,000,000 on a piece of paper. You will be paid the amount you asked for if it is deemed to be 'non-greedy'. Whether your request is indeed 'non-greedy' will be decided once all twenty request have been received by the host of the show. Your requested amount will be labeled 'non-greedy' if no other player has asked for less, and at least one player has asked for more.
How do you play?" [Weiter]
Friedrich Stadler und Miles MacLeod rezensieren in den Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Stefano Gatteis “Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Science: Rationality Without Foundations” (Routledge, 2009):
In sum, Gattei’s Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Science is an important reassertion of the value, novelty, and coherency of Popper’s programme. It is an important historiographical contribution, particularly because it leads us to reevaluate our tradition of painting Kuhn as an epistemological radical, when that title more properly belongs to Popper.
Friedrich Stadler und Miles MacLeod rezensieren in den Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Stefano Gatteis "Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science: Rationality Without Foundations" (Routledge, 2009):
In sum, Gattei's Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science is an important reassertion of the value, novelty, and coherency of Popper's programme. It is an important historiographical contribution, particularly because it leads us to reevaluate our tradition of painting Kuhn as an epistemological radical, when that title more properly belongs to Popper. Dieses zeitlose Thema (Descartes, moral sense, Hume, Adam Smith, Kant, Heinrich Heine, Franck, Nussbaum u.v.m.) ist nach wie vor von großem Interesse. Psychologische Fragen, biologische und physiologische Erkenntnisfortschritte, sowie die Fragen der Moral- und Sozialphilosophie machen es weiterhin aktuell.
Marion Ledwig hat 2006 ein Buch mit dem Titel Emotions. Their Rationality and Consistency veröffentlicht: “in the tradition of current emotion theorists, such as Elster, Damasio, de Sousa, Greenspan, Nussbaum, and Solomon, who advance the rationality of the emotions. … Besides discussing whether emotional intelligence and emotional consistency are forms of emotional rationality, this book makes clear how far this view on the rationality of the emotions can be generalized“
Dieses zeitlose Thema (Descartes, moral sense, Hume, Adam Smith, Kant, Heinrich Heine, Franck, Nussbaum u.v.m.) ist nach wie vor von großem Interesse. Psychologische Fragen, biologische und physiologische Erkenntnisfortschritte, sowie die Fragen der Moral- und Sozialphilosophie machen es weiterhin aktuell.
Marion Ledwig hat 2006 ein Buch mit dem Titel Emotions. Their Rationality and Consistency veröffentlicht: "in the tradition of current emotion theorists, such as Elster, Damasio, de Sousa, Greenspan, Nussbaum, and Solomon, who advance the rationality of the emotions. ... Besides discussing whether emotional intelligence and emotional consistency are forms of emotional rationality, this book makes clear how far this view on the rationality of the emotions can be generalized" 
